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Rayleigh fadingAbstract In this paper, Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) based blind video watermarking algo-
rithm is proposed, which is perceptually invisible and robust against rotation and collusion attacks.
To make the scheme resistant against rotation, watermark is embedded within the square blocks,
placed on the middle position of every luminance channel. Then Zernike moments of those square
blocks are calculated. The rotation invariance property of the Complex Zernike moments is
exploited to predict the rotation angle of the video at the time of extraction of watermark bits. To
make the scheme robust against collusion, design of the scheme is done in such a way that the embed-
ding blocks will vary for the successive frames of the video. A Pseudo Random Number (PRN) gen-
erator and a permutation vector are used to achieve the goal. The experimental results show that the
scheme is robust against conventional video attacks, rotation attack and collusion attacks.
 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is
an open access article under theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Digital watermarking is a well-established technique to protect
the Intellectual property and digital copyright of the multime-
dia information such as image, audio or video. It also securesthe integrity of digital contents at the time of transferring those
through the internet.
In recent times, Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG)
video standard has widespread applications in internet stream-
ing, digital High-deﬁnition (HD) handy-cams as well as in
mobile phones. So many researchers are working in the ﬁeld
of digital video watermarking (Al-Taweel et al., 2010; Guo-
juan and Rang-ding, 2009; Chao et al., 2008). Many video-
watermarking algorithms were proposed by many researchers
both in the spatial (Al-Taweel et al., 2010) or in the temporal
domain (Chao et al., 2008) as well as in the transform or fre-
quency domain (Chao et al., 2008; Al-Taweel et al., 2009;
Jing, 2009; Hartung and Girod, 1998) over the last few years.
At the time of developing a video-watermarking algorithm,
the researchers should concentrate on the two most important
things, i.e., imperceptibility and robustness (Phadikar, 2013).
Imperceptibility refers to perceptual transparency, i.e., the
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that the quality of the video frames is not perceptually
affected. Robustness refers to the ability of the watermark
extraction process to extract the watermark successfully from
the video frames, even if the quality of the frames is degraded
by various types of intentional or unintentional attacks.
In most of the video-watermarking schemes it is seen that the
discussion on robustness is mainly focused on temporal attacks
like frame dropping, frame inserting, frame rate changes, etc.
(Chao et al., 2008; Al-Taweel et al., 2009; Hartung and Girod,
1998; Liang, 2009). However, very few number of video water-
marking schemes are robust against geometrical attacks
(Al-Taweel et al., 2010; Guo-juan and Rang-ding, 2009; Jing,
2009; Wei et al., 2010; Bahrushin et al., 2009; Wang et al.,
2008; Xu et al., 2008) especially rotation of video frames in
any random angle. The rotation attack destroys the synchro-
nization of watermark extraction as it changes the pixel posi-
tions of the watermarked video frame. So there is a great
challenge for the researches to develop an algorithm which is
robust against rotation attack. Zernikemoments have a rotation
invariance property. One can ﬁnd out the angle of rotation from
the phase information of the Zernike moments. So it is widely
used in the ﬁeld of image as well as video watermarking.
Besides temporal and geometrical attacks, another type of
attack for watermarked video is collusion attack (Su et al.,
2002). In some situations, it is possible for an attacker to obtain
multiple watermarked data. The attacker can often exploit this
situation to remove watermarks without knowing the water-
marking algorithm. This kind of attack is known as collusion
attack. The collusion attack is a different kind of attack and very
few numbers of videowatermarking schemes can resist collusion
attack (Kano´cz et al., 2009; Saxena and Gupta, 2007). More-
over, in the literature, very few works are found so far which
address both rotation and collusion attacks in a single platform.
In this paper, a blind video watermarking algorithm is pro-
posed in the DCT domain. The scheme embeds watermark
before MPEG-4 encoding and extracts the watermark after
decoding. So, the scheme can be applied to both uncompressed
video or to any compression method (before and after compres-
sion). In the present scheme, the watermark information is
embedded to every frame. It offers two-fold advantages, namely
(1): it increases robustness against frame dropping and frame
insertion, (2): one can identify individual frames so that integrity
of the video is checked. The Complex Zernikemoment is used to
make the scheme robust against rotation attack. At the same
time, the design of the watermark embedding algorithm is made
in such a way that robustness is achieved against collusion
attacks, including a Rayleigh fading wireless channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
describes the details of Discrete Cosine Transformation
(DCT). Section 3 focuses on Complex Zernike moments. Sec-
tion 4 discusses Type-1 and Type-2 collusion attacks. Section 5
highlights the related works already done in this area. Section 6
explores the algorithm for embedding and extracting water-
mark. Section 7 presents performance evaluation of the pro-
posed scheme and Section 8 describes conclusions and the
scope of future work.
2. Discrete Cosine Transformation (DCT)
Transform coding is a valuable component of contemporary
image and video processing applications. Like other transforms,Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) attempts to decorrelate the
image data. It has an excellent energy compaction property
for highly correlated images. DCT can be expressed in separable
format and exhibits decrease in the entropy of an image.
After de-correlation, each transform coefﬁcient can be encoded
independently without losing compression efﬁciency (Khayam,
2003).
The one dimension DCT is deﬁned as:
CðuÞ ¼ aðuÞ
XN1
x¼0
fðxÞ cos pð2xþ 1Þu
2N
 
ð1Þ
For u= 0, 1, 2 . . . N  1.
The inverse transformation is deﬁned as:
fðxÞ ¼
XN1
u¼0
aðuÞCðuÞ cos pð2xþ 1Þu
2N
 
ð2Þ
For x= 0, 1, 2 . . . N  1.
where,
aðuÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
N
r
; For u ¼ 0 and aðuÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2
N
r
For u–0 ð3Þ
From Eq. (1) it is understood that for u= 0,
Cðu ¼ 0Þ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1=N
p XN1
x¼0
fðxÞ
Thus, the ﬁrst transform coefﬁcient is the average value of the
sample sequence. In literature, this value is referred to as DC
coefﬁcient. All other transform coefﬁcients are called AC coef-
ﬁcients. However, in image or video processing applications 2-
D DCT is used instead of 1-D DCT and it is the extension of
Eq. (1).
Cðu; vÞ ¼ aðuÞaðvÞ
XN1
x¼0
XN1
y¼0
fðx; yÞ
 cos pð2xþ 1Þu
2N
 
cos
pð2yþ 1Þv
2N
 
ð4Þ
For u, v= 0, 1, 2 . . . N  1 and aðuÞandaðvÞ are deﬁned in Eq.
(3). The inverse transformation is deﬁned as:
fðx;yÞ¼
XN1
u¼0
XN1
v¼0
aðuÞaðvÞCðu;vÞ cos pð2xþ1Þu
2N
 
cos
pð2yþ1Þv
2N
 
ð5Þ
For x, y= 0, 1, 2 . . . N  1.
In case of video, the temporal redundancy is to be exploited
to provide a better compression. Hence, adjacent pixels in con-
secutive frames show very high correlation. Consequently, this
correlations can be exploited to predict the value of a pixel
from its respective neighbors. Moreover, most of the image
and video data are still available in DCT compressed form.
So the scheme is more suitable for real time implementation.
3. Complex Zernike moments
Complex Zernike moments (Guo-juan and Rang-ding, 2009)
are constructed using a set of complex polynomials
which forms a complete orthogonal set over unit disk of
(x2 + y2) 6 1. The set of such polynomials can be deﬁned as:
Amnðx; yÞ ¼ Amnðr; hÞ ¼ RmnðrÞejnh ð6Þ
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ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x2 þ y2
p
, h ¼ tan1ðy
x
Þ and j ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1p . The symbols
r and h are deﬁned over the unit disk and Rmn(r) is the orthog-
onal radial polynomial. The symbol n is an integer (positive or
negative) depicting the angular dependence, or rotation subject
to the conditions m  |n| = even and |n| 6 m. The orthogonal
radial polynomial Rmn(r) can be expressed as:
RmnðrÞ ¼
Xmjnj2
s¼0
ð1ÞsFðm; n; s; rÞ ð7Þ
where,
Fðm; n; s; rÞ ¼ ðm sÞ!
s! mþjnj
2
 s
 
! mjnj
2
 s
 
!
rm2s ð8Þ
Based on the Eqs. (6)–(8), the Zernike moment of order n with
repetition ‘m’ of a digital image f(x, y) is deﬁned as:
Zmn ¼ ðmþ 1Þ=p
X
x
X
y
fðx; yÞ Amnðx; yÞ½  ð9Þ
where, (x2 + y2) 6 1.
In Eq. (9) Amnðx; yÞ represents the complex conjugate of
Amnðx; yÞ. To calculate the Zernike moments, the image is ﬁrst
mapped to the unit disk using polar coordinates, where the
center of the image is the origin of the unit disk. The pixels that
fall outside the unit disk are not used in calculation.
The absolute value of Zernike moments is rotation invari-
ant as reﬂected in mapping of the image to the unit disk.
The rotation of shape around the unit disk is expressed as a
phase change. If u is the angle of rotation of the original image
f(x, y), ZRmn is the Zernike moments of rotated image and Z
R
mn is
the Zernike moments of the original image then the Zernike
moments of the rotated image can be expressed as:
ZRmn ¼ ZRmnejnu ð10Þ
Hence, the rotation of an image only affects its phase angle.
One can easily estimate the rotation angle by the phase infor-
mation of the Zernike moments. Suppose the phase angle of
the original image is phaseðZmnÞ and the rotated image is
phaseðZRmnÞ then the angle of rotation u can be computed as:
u ¼ phaseðZ
R
mnÞ  phaseðZmnÞ
n
ð11Þ
where, m – 0.
4. Collusion attacks
In some cases, it is possible for an attacker to obtain multiple
watermarked copies. The attacker can often exploit this situa-
tion to remove watermarks, without knowing the watermark-
ing algorithm. An attack that needs several watermarked
copies is known as collusion attacks (Su et al., 2002; Kano´cz
et al., 2009; Saxena and Gupta, 2007). There are two basic
types of collusion attacks:
Type-1: In this type of collusion attack, attacker obtains
several copies of the same work, with different watermarks.
Here, the attacker tries to ﬁnd out the video frames which
are similar in nature. Hence, frames belonging to the same
scene have a high degree of correlation. The attacker then sep-
arates various scenes of the video. Then statistical average of
the neighboring frames is done to mix the different markstogether and computes a new unmarked frame. Type-1 collu-
sion attack can only be successful if successive frames are dif-
ferent enough. Type-1 is depicted in Fig. 1.
Type-2: In this type of attack, the attacker obtains several
different copies that contain the same watermark and studies
them to learn about the algorithm. Then several copies are
averaged by the attacker. If all copies have the same reference
pattern added to them, then this averaging operation would
return something that is closed to the pattern. Then, the aver-
age pattern can be subtracted from the copies to generate an
unmarked video. Fig. 2 depicts Type-2.
5. Related works, research gap and motivation of the present
work
In the past few years, many researchers proposed several video
(Asghar and Ghanbari, 2012) watermarking techniques both
in the spatial (Al-Taweel et al., 2010) and frequency domain
(Hartung and Girod, 1998). However, the main goal of the
researchers is to develop an imperceptible algorithm that is
robust against different types of video attacks. Hartung and
Girod (1998) proposed a DCT based blind video watermark-
ing algorithm for uncompressed and compressed video using
spread spectrum modulation. The watermark energy is spread
over all of the pixels of each of the I-frames. To achieve good
visual quality of watermarked video a drift-compensation sig-
nal is added into the P-frame in addition to watermark signal.
Chao et al. (2008) proposed a DCT based temporal syn-
chronous video watermarking technique for MPEG-4 video.
A video can be considered as a series of scenes. A scene is a ser-
ies of temporal continual and perceptually similar frames. In
case of temporal synchronization watermarking scheme,
watermark is embedded according to features of the scenes.
Here, the same watermark is embedded into frames of a single
scene, while different watermarks are embedded into perceptu-
ally different scenes. Moreover, bit-rate control is introduced
to prevent increment of size of the watermarked video and
drift-compensation is used to maintain the visual quality of
the watermarked video. In the above video watermarking tech-
niques (Hartung and Girod, 1998; Chao et al., 2008), the
robustness of the watermarked video is tested against different
types of temporal attacks as well as noise attacks. However,
those schemes are unable to show the robustness against geo-
metrical attacks, such as rotation of the video in any random
angle and cropping. There are two major ways to handle rota-
tion attack, one is geometrical correction and the other is to
embed the watermark in geometrical invariant points.
Al-Taweel et al. (2009) proposed a DCT based video water-
marking technique based on (Hartung and Girod, 1998). The
scheme shows robustness against Joint Photographic Experts
Group (JPEG) compression, noise attacks and geometrical
attacks such as rotation, scaling and cropping. However, the
correlation between original watermark and the extracted
watermark is relatively small.
L. Jing proposed a novel video watermarking algorithm
(Jing, 2009). In this scheme, the watermark is embedded into
DCT coefﬁcients of luminance component of the video.
Initially, geometric features of one frame are extracted by
Harris corner detection. Then the watermark composed of
information part and symbol part, is embedded into the video
frames. To extract the watermark, geometric attacks are
Figure 1 Collusion attack of Type-1 (averaging neighboring frames to obtain a new unmarked frame).
Figure 2 Collusion attack of Type-2 (estimating the watermark and subtracting it from the marked videos to obtain the unmarked
videos).
202 A. Karmakar et al.corrected with the help of geometric features. Guo-juan and
Rang-ding (2009) proposed a blind video watermarking
scheme that is highly robust against rotation attack. Complex
Zernike moments and Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)
are combined to develop such robust algorithm. In detection,
the possible rotation attack is corrected through Zernike
moments. Kano´cz et al. (2009) proposed a frame by frame
video watermarking scheme that is robust against collusion
attacks. Robustness of the scheme is shown against both
Type-1 and Type-2 collusion attacks as well as other types of
temporal attacks like frame dropping, inserting etc. However,
the algorithm is non-blind and not robust against geometrical
attacks.
Most of the works discussed so far focus on individual
properties while designing a video watermarking algorithm.
This is pretty reasonable as different applications demand ful-
ﬁllment of different properties. However, it is not unusual to
expect that one single video watermarking scheme may be
effective for this dual purpose. The present study is such an
attempt to address both rotation and collusion attacks in a
single platform. The signiﬁcant contributions are performance
study in Rayleigh fading wireless channel, collusion androtation attacks. The scheme can also unambiguously
distinguish parties involved in collusion operation and innocent
users.6. Proposed scheme
The scheme is divided into two major parts, i.e., watermark
embedding and watermark extraction. The block diagrams of
the proposed watermark embedding and extraction processes
are described in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively.
6.1. Watermark embedding
 In the proposed scheme, the watermark information is
embedded in every frame of the video to make the algo-
rithm robust against frame dropping and frame insertion.
 YCbCr (luminance, chrominance-red, chrominance-blue)
color model is chosen instead of RGB (red, green, blue)
color model and the luminance parts of the video are
considered as the target embedding area. This is due to
the fact that the RGB color space representation has the
Figure 3 Watermark embedding.
Blind video watermarking scheme 203most correlated components, while the YCbCr color compo-
nents are the least correlated components (Dharwadkar
et al., 2012). The correlated RGB components are not suit-
able to embed the watermark. In RGB color space the per-
ceived color quality of a video frame is dependent on all
components. Thus, embedding watermark bits into onecomponent independently of the other RGB components
is not the best choice. On the other hand the YCbCr permits
to extract uncorrelated components and it favors the
separation of the achromatic part from the chromatic parts
of the color image. To achieve high robustness and large
embedding capacity, the proposed scheme uses the least
Figure 4 Watermark extraction.
204 A. Karmakar et al.correlated YCbCr components of the color image. The color
image is represented by Y, Cb and Cr components. The pre-
sent scheme uses luminance component for data embedding
to make the scheme robust against compression. This is due
to the fact that during compression no down sampling is
done in the luminance component (Phadikar, 2010). That
means the loss in luminance component during compression
is less than the chrominance component. So the watermark
bits can be detected effectively if the bits are embedded in
the luminance component.
 A binary logo of size (M  N) is chosen as the watermark
logo. Hence, every bit of the binary logo is either ‘‘0” or
‘‘1”. To make a non-zero sequence, all the ‘‘0”s are con-
verted to ‘‘1”s.
 To make the scheme robust against rotation attack,
luminance block’s center is chosen as the center. A
square area of size (P  P) is chosen as the embedding area
where the unit circle has to be placed at the time of compu-
tation of Complex Zernike moments. The size of (P  P) is
multiple of (8  8). This is due to the fact that the present
scheme uses a block of size (8  8) to embed a watermark
bit.
 To make the scheme robust against collusion attacks, a
Pseudo Random Number (PRN) is used to select the
embedding blocks (8  8). It also ensures that the embed-
ding blocks will vary for the successive frames. To generate
the seed value of the PRN generator a permutation vector is
used and is kept as a secret key (K). Here, permutation vec-
tor is a user deﬁned secret key (K) that is used as an input
(seed value) to the PRN generator. At the time of extractionof the watermark bit, the same permutation vector is used
to regenerate the seed as well as the selection of the embed-
ding blocks.
 To compromise between ﬁdelity and robustness, a single
watermark bit is embedded into a block of size (8  8)
and the whole watermark is embedded within a group of
frames. The number of frames within a group depends on
the size of the watermark logo.
The embedding process is described as follows:
Step 1: Extract the frames from the original video one by
one.
Step 2: Change the color model of the extract frame from
RGB to YCbCr according to Eq. (12).0 1 0 1 0 1
Y
Cb
Cr
B@ CA¼
0:299 0:587 0:114
0:16875 0:33126 0:5
0:5 0:41869 0:08131
B@ CA
R
G
B
B@ CA
ð12ÞStep 3: A square block of size (P  P) is chosen in each
luminance component’s center which is considered
as the target embedding area. Data embedding into
the central area of the frame makes the scheme
resistant against cropping. The block (P  P) is
divided into non-overlapping sub-blocks of size
(8  8). It is seen that the watermark is embedded
in the central area of a frame to make the scheme
robust against cropping. Moreover, the scheme is
also secured due to the following reasons, (1) the
blocks (8  8) which are used for data embedding
Blind video watermarking scheme 205are selected pseudo randomly (key dependent), (2)
the ‘n’ number of AC coefﬁcients which are modu-
lated during data embedding are also selected
pseudo randomly (key dependent). Without the
above information, it is hard to extract the water-
mark by unauthorized user into its exact form
which in turn makes the scheme secured.
Step 4: Then Q number of distinct (8  8) blocks are
selected pseudo-randomly, where the watermark
information is to be embedded.
Step 5: Apply 2D DCT on each selected blocks (8  8).
Step 6: Select ‘n’ number of AC components pseudo ran-
domly for each DCT block (8  8). Those ‘n’ num-
ber of AC coefﬁcients of a block (8  8) are used
for embedding one bit of watermark. The same
mechanism of Step-4 is used for secret key manage-
ment of PRN generator. The modiﬁcation of AC
components is done according to the following rule:
if (W(k)==1)
do {
if (mod(C(i, j), d) 6 a)
Cw(i, j) = C(i, j)  mod(C(i, i), d)  a
else
Cw(i, j) = C(i, j)  mod(C(i, j), d) + c
endif
} until ‘n’ number of AC coeﬃcients are considered.
elseif (W(k)== 1)
do{
if (mod(C(i, j), d)P c)
Cw(i, j) = C(i, j)  mod(C(i, j), d) + e
else
Cw(i, j) = C(i, j)  mod(C(i, j), d) + a
endif
}until ‘n’ numbers of AC coeﬃcients are considered.
endif
where, W(k) is the watermark bit to be embedded,
C(i, j) is the original AC component, Cw(i, j) is
the watermarked AC components. Here, a, b, c, e
and d are the embedding strength and considered
as global constants. The relation between these glo-
bal constants is b= 2a, c= 3a, d= 4a and
e= 5a. The values are taken based on the large
number of experimentation, so that the ﬁdelity
and robustness of the watermarked video is with
an acceptable range. One may use optimization
tools like Genetic Algorithm (GA) for the selection
of better value of the above parameters for more
optimum results. The function mod(C(i, j), d) is
the remainder of C(i, j) and d.
Step 7: Compute the Zernike moments Zm;n for some speci-
ﬁc values of ‘m’, ‘n’ and save those values as keys.
Step 8: Repeat Steps 1–6 until all the video frames are
considered.
Step 9: Convert YCbCr to RGB according to Eq. (13) and
merge all frames to construct the watermarked video.
0 1 0 1 0 1
R
G
B
B@ CA¼
1:0 0 1:402
1:0 0:34413 0:71414
1:0 1:772 0
B@ CA
Y
Cb
Cr
B@ CA
ð13Þ6.2. Watermark extraction
The watermark extraction is the reverse process of embedding.
In this connection, it is to be pointed out that the scheme is
‘‘blind” which means that the scheme does not require the
cover (original data), and the embedded watermark for
extraction of the watermark signal. However, the extraction
algorithm has to know the seed of the random number gener-
ator, to determine the position of the embedding block. It is to
be noted that the watermark bits are embedded into blocks
(8  8) which are selected pseudo randomly to increase secu-
rity of the proposed scheme. The watermark extraction is
described as follows:
Step 1: Frames are extracted from the watermarked video
one by one.
Step 2: Change the color model of the extract frame from
RGB to YCbCr according to Eq. (12).
Step 3: Compute the Zernike moments ðZRm;nÞ of the rotated
watermarked video frame (Y channel) for the same
values of ‘m’ and ‘n’ that was used during embed-
ding. Then rotation is corrected using Eq. (11).
Step 4: A square block of size (P  P) is selected from the
luminance component’s center which was used as
the embedding area. Then the block is divided into
non-overlapping sub-blocks of size (8  8).
Step 5: Same Pseudo Random Number (PRN) generator is
used to select the same Q number of (8  8) blocks,
where the watermark information was embedded.
Step 6: Apply 2D DCT on each selected blocks (8  8).
Step 7: Select the same ‘n’ number of AC components
pseudo randomly which was modiﬁed at the time
of embedding and the watermark bit is detected
according to the following rule:
do {
if(mod(Cw(i, j), d) > b)
Wblock(b) = 1
else
Wblock(b) = 1
endif
} until ‘n’ numbers of AC coeﬃcients are considered.
where 1 6 b 6 n and Wblock(b) are the extracted
watermark bit and Cw(i, j) is the watermarked
AC components. Then ﬁnal decision of extracted
watermark bit W(k) from a block(8  8) is taken
depending on the maximum occurrence of 1 or
1 in Wblock(b).
Step 8: Repeat Steps 2–7 until all watermark bits are
extracted.
7. Performance evaluation
The proposed algorithm is implemented in MATLAB 7.0. The
experiment is performed on Intel Core 2 Duo CPU under Win-
dows XP. Three standard videos viz. ‘‘akiyo.mp4”, ‘‘foreman.
mp4” and ‘‘tennis.mp4” are used for the experiment. The size
of binary logo is (50  25). During simulation, we have used
150 frames of each video. The size of the square luminance
block, where the watermark is embedded, is taken as
(176  176). The value of Q, mentioned in Step 4 of the
206 A. Karmakar et al.embedding process is calculated according to the size of the
watermark logo, and in this experiment the value of Q is 50.
The value of the global constant (a) mentioned in Step 6 of
the embedding process is 13.
This study uses the Peak–Signal-to-Noise-Ratio (PSNR)
and the Mean-Structure-Similarity-Index-Measure (MSSIM)
Wang et al. (2004) as distortion measures for the watermarked
video frame, whereas the relative entropy distance (Kullback
Leibler distance) (Maity et al., 2004) is used as measure of
security (e). The high PSNR and MSSIM values of the water-
marked video frame and low security values indicate better
imperceptibility and security of the hidden data, respectively.
PSNR is deﬁned as:
PSNR ¼ 10log10
MAX2
MSE
 
ð14Þ
Here, MAX is the maximum possible pixel value of the video
frame. Mean Square Error (MSE) is deﬁned as:
MSE ¼ 1
MN
XM1
i¼0
XN1
j¼0
Xði; jÞ  X0ði; jÞ½  ð15Þ
where X is the coefﬁcients of the original video frame and X0 is
the coefﬁcients of the watermarked video frame. M and N are
the height and width of the video frame respectively.
MSSIM is deﬁned as follows (Wang et al., 2004):
MSSIMðP; PÞ ¼ 1
M0
XM0
j0¼1
SSIMðPj0 ;Pj0 Þ ð16Þ
where
SSIMðP;PÞ ¼ lðP;PÞ	 
d:½cðP;PÞb  ½sðP;PÞc ð17Þ
where P and P are the reference and the distorted image/frame
signals, respectively; Pj0 and Pj0 are the image/frame contents at
the j0-th local window; and M0 is the number of local windows
in the image/video frame. The functions lðP;PÞ, cðP;PÞ and
sðP;PÞ are the luminance comparison, the contrast compar-
ison and the structure comparison functions, respectively.
The symbols d, b, and c {d, b, c> 0} are the parameters used
to adjust the relative importance of the components.
Let the random variables R and S represent the original and
the watermarked video frame, respectively. The Kullback Lei-
bler distance D(p||q) is deﬁned as follows (Maity et al., 2004):
DðpjjqÞ ¼
X
x2X
pðxÞ log pðxÞ
qðxÞ ¼ Ep log
pðXÞ
qðXÞ ð18Þ
with 0 log
0
q
¼ 0; p log p
0
¼ 1
where p(X) and q(X) denote the probability distribution func-
tions of the random variablesR and S, respectively. The symbol
Ep represents the expectation with respect to the joint distribu-
tion p. The value is always non-negative or zero (if p(X) = q
(X)). If D(p||q) 6 e, the security value may be assumed to be e.
We calculate the Normalized Cross Correlation (NCC)
between the original watermark image (W) and the decoded
watermark image (W^) to quantify the visual quality of the
extracted watermark. The NCC is deﬁned by:
NCC ¼
P
i
P
jWijW^ijP
i
P
jðWijÞ2
ð19ÞFig. 5 shows the original and watermarked video frame along
with the PSNR, MSSIM and e values. Fig. 6(a) shows the orig-
inal watermark image, while Fig. 6(b) shows the extracted
watermark from all the watermarked video. Without the true
key, the extracted signature looks like noise (Fig. 6(c)), which
demonstrates that our scheme is sensitive to key (K) and hence
is secured. The numerical values show that the quality of
watermarked video frame is high and also the watermarked
video frame is secured. Table 1 compares the data impercepti-
bility performance of the proposed technique with the related
works (Al-Taweel et al., 2010; Guo-juan and Rang-ding, 2009;
Saxena and Gupta, 2007) for the same watermark payload.
The numerical values in Table 1 are obtained as the average
value of three independent experimentations conducted over
three videos with varied image/frame characteristics. The
relatively high values of PSNR (dB) and MSSIM indicate that
better invisibility of the hidden data is achieved by the
proposed technique.
To test the robustness of the proposed watermarking
scheme, some typical signal processing operations are per-
formed. Robustness is the measure of immunity of the water-
mark. Robustness of the proposed scheme is shown in Tables
2–5. The high NCC values in Table 2, Table 3, Table 4 and
Table 5 depict that the scheme is not only robust to frame
dropping, frame insertion and frame cropping but also rota-
tion of frame in any angle. Table 6 shows the NCC against
geometric attacks such as scaling and translation. For image/
frame scaling operation, before watermark extraction, the
attacked images/frames are rescaled to the original size. It is
seen that proposed algorithm can successfully resist attacks
like scaling and translation. Moreover, it is observed that the
proposed technique provides a superior performance com-
pared to the techniques proposed in Al-Taweel et al. (2010),
Guo-juan and Rang-ding (2009).
To study the performance for Type1-collusion operation,
we simulate fading like operation on watermarked video. We
call this operation as intelligent collusion operation. For collu-
sion attack on continuous media such as audio and video, the
estimation of time varying weights become important which is
analogous to different gains in fading channels. Fading in
wireless mobile channel means unpredictable variation in
received signal strength due to vector sum of multiple copies
of the same message signal received over variable path lengths
(Maity and Mukherjee, 2009). In (Cha and Kuo, 2009), a novel
robust Multi Carrier Code Division Multiple Access (MC-
CDMA) based ﬁngerprinting scheme against time-varying col-
lusion attack, which is similar to fading operation, is proposed.
The algorithm uses novel communication tool sets, namely,
multicarrier approach for codeword generation (Hadamard-
Walsh codes are used), time varying channel response for col-
luder weight estimation and Maximal Ratio Combining
(MRC) detector. It is quite reasonable to accept fading opera-
tion as an intelligent collusion-like as colluders would develop
an average watermarked video through variable weights
instead of equal weight to remove their identities.
To simulate collusion operations, six different watermarks
(see Fig. 7) are embedded in the host video and six different
watermarked videos are obtained. We test anti-collusion per-
formance of the proposed algorithm by transmitting ﬁrst (in
fact it is random selection from whole set) ﬁve (e.g.) water-
marked data using MC-CDMA (Maity and Mukherjee,
2009) through Rayleigh fading channel. Transmission is
Figure 5 (a) Original frame of Akiyo, (b) Watermarked frame of Akiyo, (c) Original frame of Foreman, (d) Watermarked frame of
Foreman, (e) Original frame of Tennis, (f) Watermarked frame of Tennis. (P, M, e) above each image represents the PSNR (in dB),
MSSIM and security values of the watermarked video frame.
Figure 6 (a) Original watermark image (50  25), (b) Extracted
watermark (50  25) from all watermarked video with NCC= 1,
(c) Extracted watermark using fake key.
Blind video watermarking scheme 207studied at different Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) values vary-
ing from 10 dB to 18 dB. The resultant received watermarked
video frames are then averaged. Transmission of watermarked
video through Rayleigh fading channel followed by averaging
operation is one way of implementing intelligent collusion
operation. In radio mobile communication, the small value
of SNR represents that the channel is under deep fade, while
high value of SNR represents the reverse. In the present sce-
nario, high and low SNR values represent light and heavy col-
lusion operations, respectively.Table 1 The PSNR (dB) and MSSIM values of the water-
marked images for the proposed technique and related works
(Al-Taweel et al., 2010; Guo-juan and Rang-ding, 2009; Saxena
and Gupta, 2007). Watermark payload is 1250 bits.
PSNR MSSIM
Al-Taweel et al. (2010) 41.20 0.97
Saxena and Gupta (2007) 39.99 0.95
Guo-juan and Rang-ding (2009) 42.12 0.97
Proposed technique 43.99 0.98Fig. 8(a)–(e) show watermarked video frames after time
varying collusion attacks with different weight factors (trans-
mitting each watermarked video frames through fading chan-
nel at different SNR values) and then averaged. Table 7
shows the BER (bit error rate) values for different watermarks
extracted from the colluded video. Low BER values indicate
that the scheme is robust to fading like collusion operation.
It is also seen that the BER values for columns 2–6 are quite
low compared to the BER values in column 7. The low values
of BER clearly indicate that the parties having watermarks in
Fig. 7(a)–(e) are identiﬁed as colluders. It is also quite clear
from the numerical values of BER that parties involved in col-
lusion operation would unambiguously be identiﬁed from the
innocent users (second set) even at a low SNR value (10 dB).
That is, at heavy collusion operation, although the separating
zone, that is, the difference between two sets of BER values,
are reduced with decrease in SNR values. Similar results are
also obtained if different combinations of watermarked images
in the set are used in collusion operations.
We also test anti-collusion performance of the proposed
algorithm by directly averaging the watermarked video frame,
but without channel fading. We call this operation as non-
intelligent collusion operation. Table 8 shows the results for
non-intelligent collusion operation. High NCC values in
Table 8 indicate that the scheme is also robust to non-
intelligent collusion operation. Fig. 9 shows the colluder iden-
tiﬁcation performance of the proposed scheme.Table 2 Robustness against frame drop.
Dropped frames (%) 0% 5% 10% 20%
Akiyo NCC values 1.000 0.997 0.976 0.962
Foreman 1.000 0.965 0.942 0.920
Tennis 1.000 0.989 0.962 0.931
Table 4 Robustness against frame cropping.
Cropping percentage 10 20 30 40 50
NCC (Akiyo, Foreman, Tennis) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Figure 7 Embedded watermark (50  25) for collusion-based attack.
Figure 8 Results for different channel SNR, (a): SNR= 10 dB, (b): SNR= 12 dB, (c): SNR= 14 dB, (d): SNR= 16 dB, (e):
SNR= 18 dB.
Table 3 Robustness against rotation attack.
Rotation angle Akiyo Foreman Tennis
10 0.992 0.978 0.985
20 0.976 0.989 0.976
30 0.973 0.987 0.987
45 0.996 0.985 0.974
50 0.997 0.997 0.981
60 0.987 0.974 0.988
Table 5 Robustness against frame insertion.
Inserted frames (%) 0% 5% 10% 20%
Akiyo NCC values 1.000 0.986 0.967 0.956
Foreman 1.000 0.974 0.967 0.965
Tennis 1.000 0.937 0.936 0.925
Table 6 The NCC values of the extracted watermark for
scaling and translation operations.
Scaling (down sampling
by 50%)
Translation
Al-Taweel et al. (2010) 0.73 0.68
Guo-juan and Rang-
ding (2009)
0.64 0.59
Proposed 0.91 0.76
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Table 8 Robustness against collusion attack of Type-1.
No. of averaged frames 2 5 7 10
Akiyo NCC values 0.996 0.956 0.885 0.810
Foreman 0.994 0.954 0.884 0.806
Tennis 0.994 0.954 0.883 0.802
Table 7 BER value of the extracted watermark.
Watermarks in
(Fig. 7)
a b c d e f
Parties involved in collusion
operation
Innocent
users
SNR 18 0.107 0.109 0.076 0.092 0.069 0.578
SNR 16 0.115 0.112 0.088 0.101 0.076 0.652
SNR 14 0.125 0.125 0.097 0.113 0.089 0.556
SNR 12 0.156 0.214 0.171 0.203 0.164 0.498
SNR 10 0.242 0.257 0.269 0.245 0.183 0.711
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Figure 10 Comparative performance against rotation attack.
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Figure 11 Comparative performance against collusion attack.
Table 9 Robustness against collusion attack of Type-2. PV1:
Permutation Vector 1 (used in the video-Akiyo). PV2: Permu-
tation Vector 2 (used in the video-Foreman). PV3: Permutation
Vector 3 (used in the video-Tennis).
Videos Extracted
using PV1
Extracted
using PV2
Extracted
using PV3
Akiyo NCC
values
1.000 0.5536 0.5534
Foreman 0.5464 1.000 0.5426
Tennis 0.5544 0.5256 1.000
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Figure 9 Colluder identiﬁcation performance.
Blind video watermarking scheme 209We also test anti-collusion performance of the proposed
algorithm for Type-2 collusion. Table 9 shows the results for
Type-2 collusion operation. High NCC values in Table 9 indi-
cate that the scheme is also robust to Type-2 collusion
operation.The robustness performance of the proposed method is also
compared with previously reported works (Al-Taweel et al.,
2010; Guo-juan and Rang-ding, 2009; Bahrushin et al., 2009;
Wang et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2008; Su et al., 2002; Kano´cz
et al., 2009) to demonstrate the performance comparison. In
the time of comparison of our system with the previously pro-
posed ones, we have used reference implementations provided
by the authors. It is observed from the results of Figs. 10 and
11 that the proposed method offers better gain in terms of
NCC, which is due to the use of Complex Zernike moments,
Pseudo Random Number (PRN) generator and permutation
vector which are used to select varieties of embedding square
luminance blocks (P  P) for the successive frames of the video.
In Fig. 10 it is also observed that Wang et al. (2008) returns
poor performance than others related work. This is due to
the fact that the scheme proposed by Wang et al. (2008) used
even/odd embedding. So the scheme is less robust than others.
As expected, in Fig. 11, we have seen that as the number of
frames being combined increases, the NCC value decreases. It
is also seen that there is a dip in the curve for Su et al. in
Fig. 11. This is due to the fact that in their experimentation,
every 5th frame was extracted to form the actual set of test
frames. So for every 5th frame there is a valley in the graph.
210 A. Karmakar et al.Wealso examine the time taken in onewhole procedure of the
proposed video watermarking scheme to depict the computa-
tional complexity. Our scheme is in the DCT domain which is
fast and demands computation load in O (n log n) operations
where n indicates the signal length. Feig (1990) also pointed
out; it only takes 54multiplications to computeDCT for a block
of size (8  8). So the scheme requires only 1250  54 multipli-
cations to embed thewatermark logo (50  25).Moreover,most
of the image and video data are still available in DCT
compressed form. So the scheme is more suitable for real time
implementation. The execution time of the proposed scheme is
studied and it is seen that the scheme takes on an average
126.1 s (watermark embedding: 83.42 s; watermark extraction:
42.68 s) for both watermark embedding and extraction pro-
cesses. The simulation is conducted on Pentium IV, 2.80 GHz
processor, with 512 MB RAM using MATLAB 7 version.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, a DCT based rotation attack resistant blind
video watermarking technique is proposed. Rotation invari-
ance property of the Complex Zernike moments is used to
achieve the goal, while to make the scheme robust against col-
lusion, design of the scheme is done in such a way that the
embedding blocks will vary for the successive frames of the
video. The experimental results show that the scheme provides
robustness against rotation of video in any angle, collusion
attack of Type-1 and Type-2 and conventional video attacks,
including a Rayleigh fading wireless channel. Future work
can be concentrated on further performance improvement of
the proposed scheme, as well as the development of hardware
implementation of the proposed scheme through ﬁeld pro-
grammable gate array (FPGA).
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